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THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN
MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE:
THE LESSONS OF THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS
ADDRESS DELIVERED BY

PROFESSOR ROSALYN HIGGINS
THE 1995 OTTo L. WALTER
DISTINGUISHED INTERNATIONAL FELLOW

DEAN HARRY

H. WELLINGTON:

The Otto L. Walter Distinguished

International Fellows Program, as many of you may know, brings
scholars, practitioners, and public officials in the international field
together with students, faculty, trustees, and special guests for dialogue.
It also is an occasion for a public lecture. Today our distinguished
lecturer is Professor Rosalyn Higgins, someone I have known for many
years. Professor Higgins is a deep and incisive scholar and a polished
lawyer; her formal introduction will come shortly. I know that we can
look forward to a most informative address from a professor who is an
active participant in the affairs of our world.
I want to say something about the man who makes this program
possible, and it is the case that this program is due largely to the vision
and generosity of a single man. For more than two decades, the New
York Law School has been strengthened by its association with Dr. Otto
Walter. As a member of our adjunct faculty and an active alumnus, he
has shared with our community the rich experience of a half-century of
distinguished practice in the field of international law and taxation. In
1986, Dr. Walter also became an important benefactor of this institution
with the establishment of the Otto L. Walter Distinguished International
Fellows Program. I should say that I also credit him with having helped
to position this school as a serious applicant for and now a recipient of a
$2 million grant from the Starr Foundation. This grant will endow a
professorship of international trade and finance and will help to support
the operation of a Center for International Law at this school.
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Dr. Walter's own career as a practitioner, an authority in the taxation
of international transactions, with admissions to both the German and New
York bars, has been an outstanding success by any measure. Today, at
the age of eighty-eight, he maintains an active practice in New York at the
firm of Walter, Conston, Alexander and Green, which he founded, and
also practices at a law firm in Munich. He is a graduate of Munich
University, the University of Erlangen, and, I am happy to report, of the
New York Law School. He has lectured and published widely. It is a
great pleasure to introduce my friend, Dr. Otto Walter.
DR. OTTo L. WALTER: I am deeply grateful to Professor Higgins for
accepting the award of fellowship for 1995 and to Dean Wellington for
helping to bring it about. Professor Higgins is not only a worthy
successor in the prestigious line of Walter Fellows we have heard at this
school in the past, her career in academia and in public life is superlative.
After receiving an undergraduate and a master's degree from Cambridge
University and a doctorate from Yale University, she started a brilliant
career as a lecturer, teacher, and writer, particularly in the fields of public
international law, human rights, foreign policy, and international peacekeeping. Her first teaching post was at the University of Kent, a post
which she combined with a visiting fellowship at the London School of
Economics, where she has been a tenured professor since 1981. In
addition, she has been active as a visiting professor at both Yale and
Stanford Universities. Since 1984, she has been a member of the
Committee on Human Rights, established by the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights.
While teaching, Professor Higgins found time to author several books,
close to one hundred articles, three theses, and numerous legal opinions.
Her main claim to fame may be her collection of United Nations
documents published under the title, United Nations Peace-Keeping
Documents and Commentary: 1969-1981. She received a certificate of
merit from the American Society of International Law and is now a
member of its executive committee and a vice-president. Her newest
work, published by Oxford University Press in 1994, is the revised and
annotated text of her widely-acclaimed series of fifteen lectures, held at the
Hague Academy before a group that included some of the leading
international lawyers of our time. The book is entitled Problems and
Process:InternationalLaw and How We Use It. The strange subtitle, or
somewhat strange subtitle, is due to the fact that in it Professor Higgins
has posited the difference between normative and public law. Problems
and Process is a fascinating trip through the field of international law; I
found it hard to put down.
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In addition to her writing, Professor Higgins has been active on the
Board of Editors of the American Field of International Law, the British
Yearbook of International Law, and a number of other publications.
Among the honors she has gathered through the decades, I would like to
mention four: she was made Queen's Counsel in 1986; a member of the
Institute of the International Law in 1987; a Bencher of the Inner Temple
in 1988; and, least but last, she has been selected to become a
Distinguished Fellow of the Otto L. Walter Fellowship of the New York
Law School. The subject of Professor Higgins's lecture today is the
United Nations role in maintaining international peace.
PROFESSOR ROSALYN HIGGINS:' I am very honored to be invited to speak
to you as an Otto Walter Distinguished Fellow, partly because of the
privilege of being associated with the name of Dr. Walter and partly
because of the distinction of those fellows who have gone before me. I
have chosen as my topic, "The United Nations Role in Maintaining
International Peace: The Lessons of the First Fifty Years." The history
of the United Nations, 1945-1995, in the field of peace and security,
would represent a scholarly enterprise of several volumes. One is struck
first of all by the sheer magnitude of all that has happened relating to the
U.N. 's role in world peace and security during these years: the texts, the
problems, the attempts, the developments, the successes, the failures, the
new problems, all come teeming upon each other. But looking back over
the last fifty years, it seems to me that certain trends and patterns are
clearly discernable. We cannot understand where we are now and what
problems the United Nations faces today in the field of peace and security
without understanding what was intended and what has occurred in the
intervening time. Only then can we explore what is happening today and
the implications for tomorrow.
And so I begin with the first phase: what was intended? To look at
the text of the United Nations Charter and to remind ourselves of what
was originally intended is to see how far we've come from the original
ideas of the founding fathers. The Charter was intended to provide a
comprehensive set of prescriptions on conflict resolution and the use of
force. On the one hand, there were the provisions for settling disputes
between states and the prescriptions as to when force could or could not
1. This is the text of the 1995 Otto L. Walter Distinguished Fellow Lecture delivered
at the Stiefel Reading Room at New York Law School on March 16, 1995. The revised
and footnoted version of this lecture appears as an article in the 1995 United Nations
Jubilee Issue of the European Journal of International Law (Rosalyn Higgins, Peace and
Security; Achievements and Failures,6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445 (1995)).
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be used. On the other was the intended capability of the United Nations
itself to provide collective security, if necessary, by enforcing the peace.
Chapter 6 of the Charter indicates the appropriate methods for settling
international disputes and gives the Security Council certain powers in
relation to these dispute settlement methods. As to the entitlement of
states to use force, the matter was meant to be resolved by the combined
application of Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the Charter. All use of force,
save in self-defense, was prohibited under Article 2(4). Article 51 did not
entirely match Article 2(4), in that under Article 2(4) a state could use
force if an armed attack occurs; but Article 51 prohibited the threat or use
of force. And years later, in the case Nicaragua v. United States, the
International Court of Justice was further to underline that Articles 2(4)
and 51 are not fully obverse sides of the same coin. By its finding that
not all illegal uses of force constitute an armed attack and that the right of
self-defense is available only when there is a full armed attack, the Charter
envisages that states could reasonably be required to abstain from the use
of force, save in self-defense, through the provision of collective security
by the Security Council.
Article 39 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to determine
the existence of a threat to or a breach of the peace and to recommend or
decide upon measures to maintain or restore international peace. Article
40 provides for provisional measures, Article 41 provides for non-forcible
sanctions, including diplomatic and economic sanctions, and Article 42
provides for military enforcement measures to be carried out by forces
made available to the Security Council under special agreements envisaged
in Article 43. The Security Council would thus be able to order economic
and diplomatic sanctions and also, if it so chose, military sanctions.
Forces were to be available and the decision to use them in particular
circumstances would be binding on all concerned. A military staff
committee was to be established to deal with the military planning and
logistical aspects as well as to advise the Council on a number other
military matters.
I now turn to the second phase: what actually happened and the
developments up to 1990. The failure of the United Nations to put in
place this envisaged collective security system has had several major
consequences, each of which characterizes the second phase in the last
half-century. The first is that states have come to rely, as much as they
have been able to legally, militarily, and politically speaking, on the
unilateral use of force. Unilateral military actions have been engaged in
by various of the major powers: by invoking an invitation from the state
concerned-for example, the Soviet Union in Hungary, or again in
Afghanistan; by invoking the protection of one's nationals-for example,
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the United Kingdom in Suez and the United States in Grenada; or by
invoking an extended notion of self-defense, including the protection of
one's nationals abroad-for example, the United States' actions in Libya.
The period from 1956 to 1990 was characterized by a long list of
unilateral uses of force or accompanied by some effort to articulate the
justifications by reference to Articles 2(4) and 51. Paramilitary groups not
officially under the control of the state emerged early in this period with
the operations of the Fedayeen across the Egyptian-Israeli borders in the
early 1950s. By the 1980s the phenomenon of terrorism-sometimes statesponsored, sometimes not-had become a major political factor of the era.
The impotence felt by states in the face of this phenomenon also
encouraged the unilateral use of force against those states deemed to have
instigated and supported terrorist acts, as well as reprisal raids, directed
against such groups themselves.
A second consequence was that the United Nations decided that the
absence of the agreements intended under Article 43, which it had never
been able to put in place because of the Cold War, made impossible an
obligatory call upon members to participate in military enforcement.
Military interposition, upon the request of the receiving state and with the
participation of those members of the U.N. who volunteered, would be
possible. Thus, the notion of peace-keeping was born. In 1957, with the
U.N. Emergency Force in operation, Dag Hammarskjold issued his
famous summary report of 1957, which would operate as a model for
peace-keeping operations for the next thirty-five years. Central to those
understandings were that peace-keeping would be by consent, force would
be used only in self-defense (later, in the Cyprus operation, coming after
the difficulties of the U.N. operation in the Congo, that was extended to
force to protect the integrity of the mandate and the freedom of
movement), and peace-keeping would not be used to determine political
outcomes within a country. In 1962, the International Court of Justice
confirmed the legality of such peace-keeping actions, in both Suez and the
Congo. What was left open was the question of whether enforcement
action, with states volunteering to participate rather than being
commanded, could also be lawful in the absence of the intended
agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. It was also envisaged that the
permanent members of the Security Council would not be involved in
U.N. peace-keeping, although collective security under the Charter had
been predicated exactly on leadership and control by the permanent
members. Part of the role of peace-keeping was to exclude the rivalries
of the Cold War from areas to which it had not yet spread. In later years
this principle became qualified. United Kingdom participation in Cyprus,
French participation in Lebanon, and, in due course, as the Cold War
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began to recede, United States and Soviet participation in the Middle East,
began the long road back toward the idea of major power responsibility in
peace-keeping.
As early as the Congo activities in 1960 and the Cyprus action in
1964, U.N. peace-keeping operations had begun to undertake ancillary
functions: persuasion and negotiation with local military personnel and
officials; humanitarian relief; the provision of safe passage for convoys;
and protection for the cultivation of crops. But while creative activity
occurred to maximize the possibilities, throughout this period-apart from
a brief flurry about the ability of the Organization of American States to
impose sanctions upon Cuba without reference to the U.N. and an aborted
action by the Organization of African States in relation to the Chad-Libya
dispute-there were virtually no developments relating to the use of
regional agencies.
Matters relating to regional agencies remained
dormant. NATO and the Warsaw Pact continued their growth as
collective self-defense agreements, agreeing on one thing only, namely,
that they were not regional arrangements and could thus act without the
prior permission of the United Nations.
And so I come to the third phase: the developments since the end of
the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War there has been a
marked decline in the unilateral use of force by the United States outside
of the United Nations. Since the coincidence of its own objectives and
those of the United Nations in the response to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, the advantage has been seen in the United States of making the
United Nations the center of its foreign policy-though I understand that
this once again is under reconsideration in the new Congress. The
disappearance of the old hostile Soviet Union has made the Security
Council a more comfortable environment. There has been a substantial
common interest in peace and security matters among the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom, with much common ground also with
the Russian Federation. Although China remains uneasy, it doesn't feel
strongly enough to veto.
The Gulf War was an event of global importance, securing the
liberation of Kuwait and restoring self-confidence to the United Nations.
The mechanism eventually used was an authorization to states acting in a
coalition to use "all necessary means," a phrase clearly understood as a
reference to the use of force against Iraq, if Iraq failed to comply by a
future specified date with a series of Security Council resolutions. Thus
due warning was given and time was bought for finalizing military
arrangements under United States command. In contrast to the action in
1950 in Korea, the Iraq operation was not a United Nations command;
rather, it was an authorized operation in which states were understood to
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be able to act in support of, and within the parameters of, Security
Council resolutions. The Gulf War was important in showing that the
United Nations was prepared for long-term commitment to economic
sanctions at the conclusion of hostilities if all the stipulated conditions
were not met. And it was important too for the first manifestations of the
need to also deal with the humanitarian aspects of the problem, by
addressing the predicament of Kurds through the imposition of safe
havens. But it was an imposition with the consent of the Iraqi
government-a consent periodically challenged in word and in deed.
Western States decided that they would patrol no-fly zones to ensure
respect for those zones, asserting that action to be based on the U.N.
resolutions, though not specifically authorized by them. So we now had
the new phenomenon of action authorized by the U.N. through, it was
said, an absence of protest about the action rather than through a specific
resolution authorizing it. Developments were now to come thick and fast.
The Secretary-General issued his famous Agenda for Peace, a bold
initiative in which specific proposals were made for new U.N. roles and
new U.N. methods. In the peace and security area, there was a
remarkable new topology offered without ever in terms rejecting the old
categories of enforcement and peace-keeping. The talk was now of peacemaking, peace-building, peace-enforcement, and humanitarian assistance.
And in all of these, apparently, there was to be peace-keeping support.
By implication, peace-keeping was thus no longer to be confined to
overseeing ordered and agreed cease-fires. The U.N. could, apparently
in the absence of the classic preconditions for the deployment, deliver
humanitarian aid, provide for democratic elections, and facilitate the
monitoring of human rights. U.N. peace-keeping had in fact already been
deployed in support of some of these tasks, but with the prior agreement
of both parties for a cessation of hostilities and the achievement of the
agreed outcome. So the role of the U.N. in Namibia in bringing elections,
or in Nicaragua in monitoring rights abuses, had met with a substantial
success: the former operated on the basis of South Africa's consent to the
Namibia peace-plan; the latter on the basis of the Guatemala Agreements.
Dr. Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace essentially removed the condition
that prior agreements be firmly in place. The Agenda for Peace further
spoke of the need for military support for such operations, opening the
way to an enforcement element within peace-keeping operations and thus
setting aside the long-standing distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping.
How were these new all-embracing objectives and overlapping
functions to be achieved? The answer was for the long dormant chapter
concerned with regional agencies to be revived. From the moment he
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arrived at the United Nations, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, who had already written
in his youth a leading study on the topic, sought to put regional
organizations back into center play. In his annual reports he wrote of the
support they could provide. He observed with perspicacity in his 1992
report that the moment was ripe because both regional organizations and
the United Nations were redefining their missions after the end of the Cold
War. The Agenda for Peace provided the opportunity to expand on the
subject. Referring to a new complementarity, he suggested that the
potential of regional organizations should be utilized across the new
topology of functions that he had identified: preventative diplomacy,
peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building. The proposals for this
new complementarity had a dual basis. The first was to meet a very
practical need. In the 60s, 70s, and early 80s, great efforts had been
made by successive Secretaries-General, key Secretariat personnel, and
dedicated military collaborators to build up the U.N.'s military
capabilities: staff training had been urged, Secretariat handling skills
deepened, liaisons with national decision-makers were established, and
stand-by provisions were recommended. But at the end of the day, the
U.N. members, with few exceptions, had not been prepared to earmark
forces for U.N. use and Secretariat operational command skills remained
limited.
In any event, most of these efforts had been directed at classic U.N.
peace-keeping and not at either enforcement or the new envisaged
functions of peace-making and peace-building. As to enforcement, it
rapidly became clear that, notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, U.N.
members were not at all inclined to put the original intentions of Article
43 agreements into place, though they now could have done so. Quite
simply, they did not wish the U.N. to have either standing U.N. forces or
forces on stand-by that could be called into operation upon decision of the
Security Council.
With more and more new-style peace-keeping
envisaged, and indeed already occurring, it was apparent that the U.N.
could not either materially or financially provide for its ever expanding
program. The second reason for the drive to involve U.N. regional
organizations in the U.N.'s peace and security activities was, said the
Secretary-General in Agenda for Peace, to contribute to "a deeper sense
of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs."
This stated reason reflected the alienation felt by many states in the face
of the preponderance of the so-called P3, the three permanent members,
the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. This suggestion
would only have made sense if regional organizations around the world
would assume these burdens; whereas the reality is that the organization
best equipped to do so is NATO, which was also looking for a new role.
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And the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are, of course,
critically important members of NATO, as well as of the Security Council.
The involvement of U.N. regional organizations has not had the effect
of enlarging the sense of a broader participation and the history to date of
the role that regional organizations could play has not been very
encouraging. In the first place, most regional organizations are not fitted
for military collective security or peace support. Further, it may be the
case that far from being the best place to resolve a problem within the
region, regional organizations are perceived by one of the protagonists as
irretrievably committed to the other side. The Arab League could hardly
be expected to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. The theoretical advantages
of the regional approach, that is to say, familiarity with the parties and the
issues, are offset by the practical disadvantages of partisanship and local
rivalries. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council played no
significant role in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. The Organization of African
Unity has been unable to assist in Somalia or Angola. ASEAN has made
a negligible contribution to the problems of Cambodia. And even in
Central America, it was the Contradora process, rather than the
Organization of American States, which provided the initial regional
impulse for peace-keeping. Why should it be supposed that a new
partnership could now be forged between regional organizations, often not
equipped to undertake military activities, and the U.N.?
The post-Gulf War period has been characterized by the rising
expectations of the international community. A reluctance on the part of
major states was coupled with a determination within the senior levels of
the U.N. secretariat to force the U.N. from the constraints of the past and
to harness new possibilities. And the way in which this combination of
factors has become operational on the ground is extraordinary. The
United Nations has some fifteen peace-keeping operations presently in
These
force, thirteen of them mounted in the last three years.
other
well
as
as
imperative
regional
the
underlain
considerations have
regionalism,
of
forms of novel delegation of powers. The encouragement
however loosely defined, has led in my view to disturbing phenomena.
We have seen the proliferation of institutions involved in the former
Yugoslavia, as much for reasons of competition and of regional politics as
of appropriate functional capacity. It all began with the embargo by the
European Community, its observer mission in Yugoslavia, discussions in
the CSCE and the WEU, and the eventual and tardy reference to the U.N.
Thereafter, once again, the U.N., NATO, and the WEU have all been
involved. Elsewhere, the Security Council has, after the event, approved
peace-keeping activities, for example, of the CIS in Georgia, and it has
relied on a grouping of states, the ECOWAS in Liberia, that don't
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constitute a regional agency. In short, everything is now being tried and
often simultaneously.
A major effort has been made to establish a working relationship
between the U.N. and NATO, and it has been put into operation in the
former Yugoslavia. The legal basis of this collaboration, as with so much
that today happens under the new flexible pragmatism, remains somewhat
uncertain. Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter do refer to possibilities for
regional agencies, but NATO has never been regarded as a regional
arrangement or agency; instead, it has been seen as a collective selfdefense pact. But NATO nonetheless responded to the Security Council's
request to regional bodies in January 1993 to study ways and means to
maintain international peace and security within their areas and to improve
coordination with the U.N. NATO's basic mandate, let alone the fact that
it is not a regional organization, might have been thought to have
presented a further problem because the central mandate under Article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaties states that the parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them is considered an attack on them all.
Without a formal treaty amendment to allow it either to act in
circumstances other than an attack on one of the members or out of area,
NATO has in fact systematically adopted a new role-that of peace support
operation for the U.N. The commitment is not as a generalized
commitment to the U.N., but is to be done by reference to NATO's own
procedures and with the acknowledgement that the Security Council has
the primary responsibility. However, within five months of stating its
position, NATO was acting out of area in circumstances where no member
had been attacked and in circumstances where it was not a regional agency
under the Charter. Is it easy to define whether NATO's role is
enforcement or based within a humanitarian aid, new-style peace-keeping
mission? From NATO's perspective, it is engaged in four tasks: it
monitors the no-fly zones; it is meant to enforce the no-fly zones; it offers
close air support to U.N. personnel; and it is meant to engage in air
strikes to protect safe areas. But decision-making in relation to these
procedures is complex and is in fact weighted in favor of inaction. Close
air support requires a request by those on the ground, but neither the U.N.
command nor the Secretary-General's special representative would allow
it unless an attack is still in progress. As for air strikes, a dual request,
dual key system operates. Both NATO and the U.N. can request the
action and both have to agree, so there is really a veto on the use of air
strikes on both sides. NATO's impatience with the U.N.'s response in
late 1994, when NATO wanted to act but the U.N. was reluctant, was
evident.
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So I come to the next phase, which I call: A Time for Stock Taking.
While there remains a general reluctance to impose the measures
envisaged under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter (the sanctions
measures), the rate of use of economic sanctions has undoubtedly
increased since the end of the Cold War. From 1945 to 1990, we saw just
the arms embargo against South Africa in 1977 and the comprehensive
sanctions against Rhodesia from 1966-79. Recently, we have seen the
wide-ranging sanctions against Iraq, against Yugoslavia, against Somalia,
against Serbia Montenegro, against Liberia, against Libya, economic
measures against Haiti and against parts of Angola. The tempo is
manifestly increasing. It also remains the case that in the absence of the
agreements envisaged under Article 43 of the Charter, the U.N. has never
yet decided upon military enforcement. The reasons for the inability of
the U.N. to put enforcement measures into place during the Cold War are
well-rehearsed. It has to be said that there is a general consensus that no
one wishes to put that initial possibility in place, and that being so, it
necessarily follows that the only alternative is pragmatism. For all the
rhetoric at the end of the Cold War that the U.N. would now be able to
act as it was meant to under the Charter and enforce the peace, it clearly
is not so. It has chosen not to be able to act as it was meant to, and the
appetite for enforcement has turned out to be transitory and extremely
limited. It is perceived that only a handful of states have an enforcement
capacity; they find the burden onerous, financially, militarily, and in terms
of public opinion.
The concomitant of a growing global democracy is a free press, and
the opinion there expressed is often nationalistic. The refusal to recognize
from the outset and most certainly at several discrete moments-such as
the shelling of Dubrovnik or the destruction of Vukovar-that the situation
in the former Yugoslavia is a violence across state lines (recognized as
such by the international community) and thus requiring enforcement is
woeful. It reflects a variety of factors: a desire not to repeat too rapidly
the Gulf experience, a sense that on this occasion there was no national
interest, and a despair about not being able to impose a political solution.
A state which is attacked in a manner of extraordinary barbarity is entitled
to expect the Security Council to take military action under Chapter 7 and
not to disqualify itself by reference to dispute settlement difficulties. The
constant invocation by national leaders of the lack of a national interest in
military enforcement in the former Yugoslavia merely evidences a problem
at the heart of the new-style flexible measures. Collective security under
the Charter was never meant to be predicated upon short-term national
interests. It was the long-term interest in international peace and security
that was meant to be the motivating factor. If the enforcement of peace
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is to be left to a decision by those with the capability as to whether the
attacks upon a state matters or not, the reality is that the U.N. has no real
collective security capability at all. Insisting that situations manifestly
calling for enforcement are in fact situations calling for new style peacekeeping operations is simply a turning away from unpleasant realities.
While it is in my view lamentable that states have failed to seize the
opportunity offered by the end of the Cold War, so far as effective U.N.
enforcement is concerned, the lessons that the U.N. itself seems to draw
from the Bosnia debacle are disturbing. Instead of deciding by reference
to objective criteria the category of U.N. action required, the
contemporary thinking seems to be resolutely against differentiation. We
have thus seen the character of the operation change from moment to
moment or have within it totally irreconcilable elements. I want to read
a quotation from Kofi Annan, the U.N. Under Secretary-General for
peace-keeping operations (for whom I have a great admiration, although
some of his comments disturb me). He has stated that "the international
community now wants the United Nations to demarcate boundaries, to
control heavy weapons, to quell anarchy, to guarantee humanitarian aid.
There are clearly tasks that call for teeth and muscle, in other words," he
says, "there are increasing demands that the U.N. now enforce the peace
as originally envisaged in the Charter." However, any demands that the
U.N. now enforce the peace as originally envisaged in the Charter will
certainly not be met by treating situations requiring enforcement as
requiring what he calls "muscular peace-keeping." That is not what the
Charter envisaged. What the Bosnia experience shows is that when peacekeepers, whose prime mandate is to deliver humanitarian aid, are in place,
then all realistic prospect of enforcing the peace has gone. The
enforcement of the protection of the victims has effectively been put aside
by this selection of method of U.N. operation. And insofar as resolutions
make some later provision for protection, such as the establishment of safe
havens, enforcement of these too becomes intertwined with the protection
of the U.N. personnel on the ground. The safety of the peace-keepers
becomes, in effect, the sole consideration and even then the fear of
reprisals against national contingents serving in the U.N. operation
becomes the dominant factor and there is no realistic enforcement of any
sort, even when NATO capability has been put in place. The failure in
the former Yugoslavia to protect the designated safe areas because of fears
of the safety of U.N. personnel reveals the profound disagreements within
the expanded U.N. peace-keeping system. NATO had put in place the
capacity to respond to a U.N. request for air strikes, but when these were
asked for by the Nordic battalion, for example, they received neither the
support of the U.N. commander in Bosnia, Sir Michael Rose, nor of Mr.
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Akashi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative. As the U.N.'s
policy is that air strikes can only take place when an attack is in progress,
it hardly needs to be explained that that condition will rarely if ever, be
met. The policy is in fact an invitation for frequent attacks on the U.N.
of a short duration.
So it is time to call for a pause and to take stock of the recent efforts
of the U.N. I offer some tentative conclusions in my final remarks.
First, the U.N. must face the issue of an enforcement capability and its
responsibilities in this regard. The authorization of coalition forces
appears to be all that is on offer and the United States has also made it
clear that it would not place its forces under a unified command. This
technique is not necessarily unacceptable, but it is also clear that it ensures
that enforcement will only occur when there is a perceived national interest
in doing so on the part of the major military powers. States, especially
those that rely on self-defense alone, are entitled under the Charter to turn
to the Security Council if they are attacked. But the members of the U.N.
have turned away from the opportunity provided by the end of the Cold
War to rectify the situation. Second, while the rigidities of the Cold War
should not constrain us in the forthcoming phase of the U.N.'s life, this
does not mean that all legal consideration should be put on one side, and
that the only factor should be pragmatism. The continued understanding
of the ground rules about the circumstance in which enforcement on the
one hand and peace-keeping on the other is to be appropriate is the best
guarantee of respect for the U.N. and of the achievement of its objectives.
Third, while the desire by the U.N. Secretariat to acquire flexibility is
understandable, its disadvantages have been underestimated. Pragmatism
must have its limits if contributors and protagonists alike are to know what
to expect. Today, we have swung so far from principle towards flexible
pragmatism that there is no clear understanding of what the U.N. may or
should do in different particular circumstances. Fourth, enforcement
should remain clearly differentiated from peace-keeping. Peace-keeping
mandates should not contain within them an enforcement function. To
speak of the need for more "muscular peace-keeping" is simply evidence
that the wrong mandate was chosen from the start. Although the U.N.
may endeavor to separate out these combined functions, the protagonists
will inevitably perceive calls from the U.N. to NATO as entailing a loss
of U.N. impartiality. The incoherence in decision-making and the
confusion in the various command structures encourages contempt for a
U.N. seen both as weak and partisan. Fifth, it follows from all of this
that the technique of establishing safe havens is not to be regarded as
desirable.
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Sixth, there's little advantage and considerable disadvantage in setting
aside classic peace-keeping in favor of the new mixed function peacekeeping enumerated in Dr. Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace. This has
served to sow the seeds of uncertainty and confusion and has placed in
jeopardy, perhaps irredeemably, all that has so painstakingly been brought
up over the years in U.N. peace-keeping operations. Seventh, no peacekeeping force should be put in the field without prior agreement on a
cease-fire and a realistic political prospect of the seriousness of that
undertaking. The key peace-keeping function must remain the security of
peace on the ground and only then should ancillary functions be added.
Humanitarian assistance, electoral observation, and human rights
monitoring should be in addition to, and not take the place of, the securing
of peace. Never again should the U.N. engage in a form of peace-keeping
as in Yugoslavia, which endeavors to provide food while allowing the
slaughter to continue. Eighth, the experiment in achieving a secure
environment, perhaps through the efforts of individual states, before
putting U.N. peace-keeping operations in place to maintain the peace and
perhaps engage in ancillary functions should be allowed to continue. The
Somalia and Haiti experiences point, to date, in somewhat different
directions. The lesson seems to be that the provision in the first place of
a secure environment by one state so that the U.N. can proceed to the
second humanitarian phase is only likely to be achieved if a dictator is
required to depart and a new democratic government installed. Where
there are collapsed structures of state authority, as in Somalia, the mission
will almost certainly not succeed. Finally, it remains an inescapable truth
that financial commitment is the yardstick of the seriousness of an
intention to maintain peace. In the absence of material provision, there is
no real political realm to keep the peace. Throughout the history of the
United Nations, its members have not been willing to pay the modest sums
needed to secure the performance of its tasks. In this alone, nothing has
changed since the end of the Cold War; the traditional financial
irresponsibility continues unabated into this new era. After fifty years, so
much has happened in United Nations peace-keeping, but the journey
ahead remains a daunting and disturbing one.
Postscript: In the intervening period between the delivery of this lecture
in March 1995 and its publication, important developments have occurred
in Bosnia. NATO was authorized to engage in repeated air strikes to
require the Bosnia Serbs to withdraw certain heavy artillery out of range
of the designated "safe areas." And this military action led in due course
to the Dayton Accords and new tasks for NATO and the U.N. But this
change of policy occurred only because Croatian forces, and then Bosnian
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forces, made significant miliary advances on the ground. Without those
advances, there is no reason to suppose that the U.N. would have moved
to a more robust policy to secure its mandate under the relevant resolution.

